<p>Response to “monydad” two above: </p>
<p>according to a quantitative rating system that evaluates “head to head” student acceptance situations between schools… last year [2010] Tufts was ranked #27 among all national universities and liberal arts schools. </p>
<p><a href="http://college./colleg…isCategory=ALL%5B/url%5D">http://college./colleg…isCategory=ALL</a></p>
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<p><a href="http://www./blog/2009/…lege-rankings/%5B/url%5D">http://www./blog/2009/…lege-rankings/</a></p>
<p>An explanation of the rating system by “**************” is below. </p>
<p>We have implemented the MyChances College Rankings based on revealed student preference. In this system, the college admissions process is treated like a chess tournament. The colleges play matches (which occur when 2 colleges admit the same student). In each match, there is a winner (the college that the student ends up attending) and a loser. The winner gains points; the loser forfeits them. When a high-ranked school beats a low ranked school, the high-ranked school gains few points, and the low-ranked school loses few points. If a low-ranked school beats a high-ranked opponent, it gains more points than if it beat an equally-matched opponent. After playing many games, the colleges that students prefer rise naturally to the top of the rankings.</p>
<p>Does the method of revealed student preference meet the 3 criteria outlined above? I believe it does.</p>
<p>Consider point #1 (gaming the system). Imagine that MIT wanted to beat out Harvard by trying hard to avoid admitting any students that they thought would be admitted to Harvard. They would end up succeeding in a model based on acceptance rate and yield (since their yield would likely increase), but their actual student body would be less qualified. In the revealed preference model, however, they would be less successful. They would not compete head-to-head with Harvard, so would ‘win’ more. But they would be winning against weaker ‘opponents’, earning fewer points for each victory.</p>
<p>For point #2 (relevance), the idea of revealed preference is that it aggregates the sum total of what matters to students – whatever those factors might be. It is likely that students behave rationally (by attending the school that they find most desirable). So long as other students share similar values, then revealed preference rankings will work well in explaining, and even guiding, their decisions.</p>
<p>For point #3 (stability), the tournament style system is simple and straightforward. It is responsive to changes in student preference over time. It does not rely on aggregations of various statistical factors, or college faculty survey results; nor does it depend upon arbitrary weighting of those factors.</p>
<p>The details of the procedure that we use to generate the rankings, and our use of chess-style Elo points, will be explained in a later post. For an academic treatment of a similar college ranking system, I recommend the working paper, “A Revealed Preference Ranking of U.S. Colleges and Universities,” 2005, by Christopher Avery, Mark Glickman, Caroline Hoxby, and Andrew Metrick (free link).</p>