Naval Makeover

Colleges and Universities A-Z Naval Academy - Annapolis
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<p>Council on Foreign Relations article regarding the nation's maritime strategy "...A shift from sea combat to fighting terrorism, protecting shipping routes, and providing humanitarian assistance." </p>

<p>BTW, Admiral Fowler is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.</p>

<p>A Naval Makeover
October 31, 2007
Prepared by: Greg Bruno</p>

<p><a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14680/naval_makeover.html?breadcrumb=%2F%5B/url%5D"&gt;http://www.cfr.org/publication/14680/naval_makeover.html?breadcrumb=%2F&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p>

<p>Sixty-five years after World War II's Battle of Midway, the United States remains the world's only naval superpower. U.S. planners now face the challenge of preserving that dominance while adjusting to a new world of threats. A maritime strategy unveiled October 17-a partnership involving the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard-advocates a shift from sea combat to fighting terrorism, protecting shipping routes, and providing humanitarian assistance. Naval experts say the move is intended to reposition the service from a Cold War fighting machine to a post-9/11 prevention force. Human and economic "soft power" have "been elevated to the same level as high-end naval warfare," one Navy official told the Washington Post.
The strategic overhaul includes no details about funding or ship numbers. Some Navy officials have complained (DefenseNews.com) the document doesn't go far enough. The makeover comes at a time of tough budgeting talk in Washington. The Pentagon counts fewer than 280 ships in its fleet, down from 350 in the 1990s. In February 2006 the Navy unveiled plans to increase its ship total to 313.</p>

<p>But the price is steep; the Navy estimated its plan would cost taxpayers $16.5 billion annually for the next thirty years; the Congressional Budget Office says it will cost more like $20.6 billion a year. George Friedman, CEO of Strategic Forecasting Inc., a private intelligence firm, questions whether the payoff is worth it: "What is the value of naval power in a world in which naval battles are not fought?" For the Navy, the answer is obvious. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy's former chief of naval operations, told lawmakers in March 2007 that maritime supremacy is the most powerful U.S. deterrent abroad.</p>

<p>Robert D. Kaplan, a visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, writes in The Atlantic that the course change comes at a defining moment for the Navy. Most notably, he writes, China is expanding its navy as U.S. ship numbers are sinking, a shift that could have global significance. According to the Financial Times, China's navy-which two decades ago amounted to "little more than a sleepy coastguard"-is at the heart of its drive for a return to greatness. Military analysts say the most immediate outcome of a larger Chinese navy would be a struggle over control of the Taiwan Strait with Taiwan...</p>

<p>Read the complete article:</p>

<p><a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/14680/naval_makeover.html?breadcrumb=%2F%5B/url%5D"&gt;http://www.cfr.org/publication/14680/naval_makeover.html?breadcrumb=%2F&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p>

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<p>I don't like it. It seems like after every major war we decide to make a "leaner" military. When the "next war" arrives, we suddenly decide that our lean military can't do what we want. I realize that the government is always trying to balance cost and benefits, but we don't have the greatest track record of adequately preparing. Even our current operations are stretching the military (Army and USMC moreso that AF and Navy, but still...). I hate to see history repeat itself in this way, and that's what I feel might be happening.</p>

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<p>Similar efforts to draw down </p>

<p>"What is the value of naval power in a world in which naval battles are not fought?" 2007.............</p>

<p>Postwar Naval Force Reductions 1945-1950: Impact on the Next War
"The force structure of the U.S. Navy was reduced dramatically during the five years following the conclusion of the Second World War. Planning efforts were complicated by the lack of a clear threat, inter-service rivalries and uncertainty in the national military strategy Support for naval forces dwindled steadily until the Navy was unable to respond effectively to the crisis presented by the Korean War in 1950. " Hodermarsky, George T. NWC 1990</p>

<p>Will we Never Learn?</p>

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<p>"Hoder" was one of my instructors - I can't remember if it was the P-3 FRS in Jax or in TAO school in San Diego. Smart guy.</p>

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<p>
[quote]
I realize that the government is always trying to balance cost and benefits

[/quote]
</p>

<p>LOL. And failing miserably. :mad:</p>

<p>The REALLY funny thing is that the folks who are always all for the drawdowns and the leaning-outs are the same clowns who went ballistic when Rumsfeld uttered a plain truth: You DO go to war with what you've got, not what you WISH you had.</p>

<p>It was once easy to plan for the next conflict: you looked around the world at those nations with potent Navies, counted their ships, aircraft, and facilities, and designed weapons, systems, and Orders of Battle accordingly. Nowadays, there are very few potential all-out foes (but China is growing), and the threats can come from small Boston Whalers. </p>

<p>It is going to be exceedingly difficult to plan for a force that can fight low-intensity conflicts such as a localized Persian Gulf skirmish, asymetrical battles such as those waged against terrorists, and full-scale wars such as what would result if China went after Taiwan, and to do all three well.</p>

<p>It's going to cost money. It always does. You get what you pay for.</p>

<p>Hopefully, the planners at the Puzzle Palace will not repeat the same turf wars of yesteryear, and the dorks on the Hill will put aside their pathetic little agendas to fund the forces we are going to NEED.</p>

<p>Hope springs eternal... :rolleyes:</p>