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Scientific Revolution this philosophy was very different and did not really accomodate the rational thought and empericism associated with science today.
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<p>Huh? Then who were John Locke and David Hume? Was the former not the father of empiricism? Was the latter, in addition to Kant, not responsible for awaking us from our dogmatic slumber?</p>
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experiment on falling bodies because no one bothered to question the accepted dogma.
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<p>Here is some news: it is called Humean Skepticism. Read about it.</p>
<p>Here is an excerpt from the course description of my philosophy of science course:</p>
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The early logical empiricists, and especially Rudolph Carnap, were impressed with the development of modern logic at the hands of Russell and Whitehead and with the purely formal character of Hilbert's axiomatization of geometry. They were equally impressed with the development of contemporary physics and took that science as the paradigm of empirical knowledge. They thus were inspired to reconstruct the scientific enterprise itself as an axiomatic logical system. This reconstruction was to serve as the model for epistemology, and epistemology was to become the entirety of philosophy. </p>
<p>It is perhaps natural to think of scientific theories as special kinds of languages the way the logical empiricists did. But it is not so easy to make that insight precise, and at the same time preserve its explanatory role. By the time the empiricists' reconstruction was ``complete" the point of the exercise---understanding epistemology by understanding science---had been inverted. We were now attempting to fill in the gaps in our account of scientific theories by appeal to decidedly non-empirical entities: dispositions, counterfactuals, laws, etc. But the point had been to illuminate all of these by the proper analysis of the epistemology of science. Along the way, as well, all connection to the sciences as actually practiced was lost. So now we had neither an informative account of the scientific enterprise itself, nor an informative account of its implicit epistemological structure. Instead we had an unmotivated analysis of certain unwieldy formal languages. </p>
<p>Almost immediately in the wake of the failure of the logical empiricist program a new account of scientific theories arose, the semantic view. On that account theories are not special kinds of language but rather certain kinds of mathematical structure. Analysis of a scientific theory just is analysis of its mathematical structure. The account is sufficiently general to include more than mathematical sciences and has been applied to biology as well for example. While still the dominant account of scientific theories, its flaws are becoming more and more obvious. These flaws concern primarily the account's failure to explain important features of the role of theories in scientific change.
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<p><a href="http://explore.georgetown.edu/courses/index.cfm?Action=View&CourseID=PHIL%2D773%5B/url%5D">http://explore.georgetown.edu/courses/index.cfm?Action=View&CourseID=PHIL%2D773</a></p>
<p>Philosophy continues to shape science to this moment. Have you ever heard of Bayesianism? Do you even know how to define a theory? Do not give me some dictionary-definition; that is just a palliative. Do you know who Thomas Kuhn is and the impact he had on science?</p>
<p>What launched empiricism, and science by implication, were the empiricist philosophers of the modern era. What continued to affect science was logical positivism, and later, logical empiricism.</p>