Ex-Halsey CO fires back

[GreatAmerican]

<p>Pinckney describes ‘discord’ in the wardroom, disputes crew’s recollection of fateful night</p>

<p><a href="http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/10/navy_halsey_071105w/%5B/url%5D"&gt;http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/10/navy_halsey_071105w/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p>

<p>
[quote]
When Cmdr. John Pinckney took command of the destroyer Halsey on May 18, 2006, in San Diego, he assumed the lead of a state-of-the-art American warship yet to make its maiden deployment and, with it, a crew crackling with energy.</p>

<p>Under its previous commander, the Halsey set a record for getting a ship certified to deploy, doing so within 200 days of commissioning. The plank-owners began training while still in the shipyard, and within months of arriving in home port, it was surge-ready....

[/quote]
</p>

[Zaphod]

<p>A few comments from a former SWO, based entirely upon what is in this story…</p>

<p>

He stayed in his stateroom during and after the fire, leaving the situation to his crew. “I never go to the scene of a casualty,” he explained.

</p>

<p>Nor does any other CO. However, you WOULD have gone to DC Central or the Quarterdeck, from which you would have been far more effective. (DCC would have been my choice.)</p>

<p>

While Pinckney stayed put, the Navy investigation concluded, the efforts to fight the fire got off to a poor start. Some sailors were too drunk to get into their firefighting gear.

</p>

<p>Drunk while on duty? :eek:</p>

<p>

Pinckney acknowledged a simmering “discord” between him and his wardroom. He said the other officers didn’t support what he wanted to do. But one chief saw a CO who prized keeping junior sailors happy, a priority not wholly shared by his wardroom and mess.

</p>

<p>So what? </p>

<p>CO’s are not always the most popular folks on the planet (recent threads concerning the new Supe come to mind), but they are still IN COMMAND. The other officers don’t NEED to support “what he wanted to do” unless it was illegal or dangerous, in which case they had a responsibility to speak up to the CO or higher authority. By NOT doing either, they were delinquent of duty. :mad:</p>

<p>

One petty officer, who served under Pinckney and who asked not to be named, said the command environment declined rapidly during Pinckney’s tenure. “Halsey is home to some fine sailors, and I say that having served on three other ships,” he wrote in an e-mail to Navy Times. “What we lived through on the 2006 deployment was as close to a ‘Caine Mutiny’ style experience as you can get.”

</p>

<p>Disturbing, to say the least.</p>

<p>

The ship completed its Western Pacific deployment and returned to San Diego on Dec. 24. The second fire, in January, damaged the main reduction gear so badly it had to be replaced — at a cost of $8.5 million.

</p>

<p>It will be interesting to see what the results of the investigation are. Main reduction gears are one of those things that are jealously guarded against damage, both accidental and intentional. To have one fire break out near them is bad enough, but accidents happen. To have TWO do so, with the second destroying the gears (and thus effectively welding the ship to the pier), is VERY bad news.</p>

<p>

Vice Adm. Terrance Etnyre, commander of Naval Surface Forces, fired Pinckney on Feb. 2 for loss of confidence.

</p>

<p>Not surprising, really. Too many issues. Fires, lack of responsiveness, drunk sailors on duty, extensive damage resulting in loss of capability. YUCK!</p>

<p>

Pinckney repeatedly encouraged on-duty sailors to drink alcohol.</p>

<p>One on-duty officer told the executive officer she was just holding a beer “to placate the CO,” according to the executive officer’s statement to investigators. The XO told investigators, “I took alcohol away from one duty section member … who got upset and indicated that the CO said it was OK.”</p>

<p>Another crew member reportedly accepted a beer from the skipper, but poured the contents overboard.

</p>

<p>ASSUMING this is true, he deserves to be fired. If it ISN’T true, then we’ve got some REALLY BAD issues to deal with, because such a wave of lies is a mutiny by any other name.</p>

<p>

Pinckney, in his interview with Navy Times, disputed nearly every assertion made by other crew members in the investigation.

</p>

<p>So either he is right and they are all lying (in which case we have a mutiny, which in turn begs the question, “WHY do we have a mutiny?”), or they are telling the truth and HE is lying, in which case, GOOD RIDDANCE!</p>

<p>

Asked to respond to accusations by the crew that he ignored repeated calls and knocks on his cabin hatch, Pinckney said he could not hear the alarm bells, or the knocking on his door from the passageway. </p>

<p>However, the investigation report quotes an officer who told investigators that Pinckney called down to tell that officer to stop using the 1MC to provide updates as the crew fought the fire.

</p>

<p>I’m sorry, but based on my shipboard experience, I call BS.</p>

<p>For those of you who may not be privy to the different comm circuits on a ship, the 1MC is the ships’ PA system, and is controlled by the OOD, either on the Quarterdeck while inport, or from the Bridge while underway. While it is true that the 1MC can be set to exclude Officer’s Country, the Chief’s Mess, etc., there is NO WAY IN HELL that an emergency like a fire would not be sounded on ALL CIRCUITS. Additionally, there is NO WAY IN HELL that the Command Duty Officer (the guy in command of that day’s inport watch section) and the XO could both know about a fire and NOT notify the Captain immediately if he was onboard. Also, the 1MC is SUPPOSED to be used for updates. It’s standard practice. Also, there is NO WAY IN HELL that a CDO or XO would release the OPREP 3 message to CINCPAC regarding the fire without the CO’s approval if he was onboard. Finally, there is NO WAY IN HELL that a real fire (especially in the main spaces) could be announced and fought without the racket and activity being heard everywhere. In the event that the fire in question was caused by either a lube oil or fuel oil leak, then not only would the 1MC have been used, but GENERAL QUARTERS would have been sounded, and I can assure you that THAT alarm is heard EVERYWHERE. </p>

<p>Additional background information: General Quarters is sounded in the event of a fuel oil or lube oil LEAK, let alone fire, in order to ensure that the ship is buttoned up tight. Main-Space fires are the bane of any ship afloat because the ship CAN be lost, and very quickly. By locking down the main spaces (spaces with propulsion equipment) and isolating them both electrically (to prevent sparks and such) and mechanically (to prevent supplying the fire with oxygen), the Damage Control (DC) party has a better chance of getting ahead of the fire and putting it out, or else keeping a leak from flaring into a fire.</p>

<p>So, in short, I’m not buying the “I didn’t hear a thing” excuse, unless we actually have a real mutiny here, which I highly doubt.</p>

<p>

Pinckney concedes that he delayed sending a report on the fire up his chain of command until the next day

</p>

<p>Unacceptable. While the guidelines may have changed since my time, even small fires in mainspaces require reports within a few hours at most. In my day it was less than 1 hour.</p>

<p>

but he disagreed with the investigation report’s contention that the commander failed to mention that the fire affected the critical MRG in his official communications to the destroyer squadron and strike group commanders.

</p>

<p>This is stupid. Just pull the OPREP 3 message and read the damned thing. It’s not complicated.</p>

<p>

“It said we had a fire in the dehumidifier, a flashover in the MRG and that we’re investigating and we’ll send a further report.”

</p>

<p>This is where I will concede some ignorance. My ship was a 1960’s design and I don’t recall having “dehumidifiers” in the mainspaces aside from those in the A/C plants, but I do know that a flashover to the MRG’s indicates a Class B fire involving lube oil. That is BAD NEWS.</p>

<p>

Pinckney said he was not fully aware of the extent of the drinking aboard his ship. Although he was present on the ship throughout the event, he said his chiefs and officers failed to report the problems to him. In fact, he said, it wasn’t until he was back in San Diego two months later that he learned on-duty sailors had been drinking at all.</p>

<p>“I didn’t know there was anything wrong until January. And I am like, ‘Where in the heck did this come from?’ How can you have an [executive officer, command master chief, command duty officer, engineering duty officer, master-at-arms] and none of this stuff get reported?”

</p>

<p>Indeed! :eek:</p>

<p>If he is telling the truth, then this will be one ship that is studied for generations for a total collapse of leadership at all levels. If he’s lying, well, that’s already been taken care of…</p>

<p>

Asked if he believes someone had it in for him, Pinckney said: “Me, personally, I do. These reports that are supposed to come up to the CO, I didn’t get any.

</p>

<p>Why weren’t you asking? </p>

<p>

But Pinckney also acknowledges that, in the Navy, someone is always accountable. “Someone has to pay.”

</p>

<p>Sadly, this is true. The CO pays whether or not it’s his fault. It may not be fair, but that’s life.</p>

<p>

He admits there were problems in the wardroom. “One of the issues that was brought out was that there wasn’t a harmonious relationship between the XO, the [assistant operations officer] and myself,” he said. “There were meetings where I’d walk out and the things I’d talked about would be harshly criticized. I would hear about that through a backloop,” he said. “There would be wardroom meetings and I’d talk about the things I wanted to do, and they would strongly question those things.”

</p>

<p>Well, that’s a problem only the CO can fix. In addition, if this actually happened, then the XO either needs to be relieved as well or else never permitted to be a CO himself. You cannot undercut your Commanding Officer like that and then expect to become one yourself. If you cannot be trusted as XO, you do not rate trust as a CO.</p>

<p>

“He was very much concerned with the morale and well-being of the junior sailors, and that caused some problems in the upper levels,” he said. “He’d keep the blueshirts happy, but the chiefs and the officers were trying to get some work done.”

</p>

<p>Huh? </p>

<p>Never once in my five years and two ships at sea did I ever once run across an officer who in any way didn’t want the best for his troops. If this CO was doing what is described, then the wardroom would have gone right along with it unless it was illegal or affected operational effectiveness. This gripe just doesn’t sound right. More details needed…</p>

<p>

Standards loosened, the chief said, and the skipper emphasized recreation events such as bingo nights and extra liberty chits, which weakened duty sections. Civilian garb became more common aboard the ship.</p>

<p>“It kind of turned into a joke after a while,” he said, referring to the lax standards.

</p>

<p>I’d need specifics before commenting on this. What is too lax for some may not be for others…</p>

<p>

Pinckney faults the investigation for not going deeper into what happened that night, and he said the investigator never asked him to make a statement.

</p>

<p>I doubt that, but anything is possible, I suppose…</p>

<p>

“The worst thing that could ever happen to anybody that’s in command is to lose command.”

</p>

<p>Tell me about it. :(</p>

[rjrzoom57]

<p>Remarkable story…I guess it’s ironic that a guy that came up from enlisted ranks as a former fire control man has his command ended by the circumstances surrounding his handling of a fire…</p>

[2012mom]

<p>Correct me if I’m wrong, but I’m pretty sure that a Fire Controlman rating has to do with weapons operations, not fire fighting aboard ship.</p>

[rjrzoom57]

<p>^^^^^^^^ :)</p>

[Zaphod]

<p>

Correct me if I’m wrong, but I’m pretty sure that a Fire Controlman rating has to do with weapons operations, not fire fighting aboard ship.

</p>

<p>That is correct.</p>

<p>Unless they’ve changed the rate structure (they do that from time to time), the “professional” firefighters onboard are Damage Controlmen (DC’s), with the response parties being made up of enlistedmen from all rates who have been trained in Damage Control.</p>