Sithis
August 7, 2010, 4:35am
56
<p>And here is the additional post I promised:</p>
<p>You seem to assume that my rejection of your direct realism comes from some mystical/supernatural perception of the universe. On the contrary, it comes from reasoned philosophical thought, the physics/biology of sense organs, and my understanding of quantum physics. The objections to direct realism in the wiki article I linked you to earlier summarize my views and why I hold them quite aptly:</p>
<p>
The argument from the scientific account of perception
“The main aspects of that account that are cited in this connection are: (i) the fact that the character of the resulting experience and of the physical object that it seems to present can be altered in major ways by changes in the conditions of perception or the condition of the relevant sense-organs and the resulting neurophysiological processes, with no change in the external physical object (if any) that initiates this process and that may seem to be depicted by the experience that results; (ii) the related fact that any process that terminates with the same sensory and neural results will yield the same perceptual experience, no matter what the physical object (if any) that initiated the process may have been like; and (iii) the fact that the causal process that intervenes between the external object and the perceptual experience takes at least a small amount of time, so that the character of the experience reflects (at most) an earlier stage of that object rather than the one actually existing at that moment. In extreme cases, as in observations of astronomical objects, the external object may have ceased to exist long before the experience occurs. These facts are claimed to point inexorably to the conclusion that the direct or immediate object of such an experience, the object that is given, is an entity produced at the end of this causal process and is thus distinct from the physical object, if any, that initiates the process. ”
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[quote]
Quantum physics and na</p>