<p>I have a huge test tomorrow and I just want to make sure I'm actually correct with my Philosophy of Mind stuff. If anyone that's good at that can PM me, that'd be GREAT.</p>
<p>Thanks!</p>
<p>Why not just post questions you may have here? You'd probably get more help that way.</p>
<p>Mostly because it's a list of 25 question, but yeah, i guess I'll post it</p>
<p>It's basic overview on dualism, stuff like that. I missed a few lectures, especially for Chalmers, so I'm not too sure...</p>
<p>I.Dualism and Reductionisms:</p>
<p>1) What are the two principle claims of a predicate dualist?
a) Mentalalistic descriptions are necessary for a full description of the world
b) Mentalatistic descriptions can not be reduced to another form</p>
<p>2) What is the metaphysical significance of predicate dualism?
-First, it is neutral towards a materialistic / dualism distinction
-Second, it says nothing about reduction other than it rules out type-type reduction</p>
<p>3)Explain the distinction between a type and a token
type - a set of things
token - something specific within the set</p>
<p>4) What is the difference between a type-type reduction and a token token reduction?
type-type says that all mental state goes to one physical state
token-token says that individual mental states goes to individual physical states</p>
<p>5) What is the basic metaphysical claim being made by the property and substance dualist, that is not made by someone who is merely a predicate dualist?
The basic metaphysical claim made by property and substance dualist is that we are lacking in the ontology of physics, while the predicate dualist says that we are lacking in the ontology of language. </p>
<p>6) Why can the substance dualist accept the possibility of disembodied cognition but no tthe property dualist?
The substance dualist can accept the possibility of disembodied cognition because they see the mental and the physical as two seperate things, while the property dualist says that the mental "emerges" from the physical.</p>
<p>7) Define physical supervenience. Why is property dualism compatible with the principle of phsyical supervenience even though it is not a materialist position?
Physical supervenience is basically, two objects alike in the physical, can not have different mental and you can't have a change in the physical without having a change in the mental. This is property dualism compatible because property dualist says that the mental emerges from the physical.</p>
<p>8) Explain the difference between interactionism and epiphenomenalism.
Interactionism says that physical --> mental have a casusal relationship, while mental and physical also have a casueal relationship
Epiphenmenalism says that only the physical --> mental have a casual relationship</p>
<p>9) State Descartes's modal argument for substance dualism
I can conceive of the body without the mind
If I can conceive, it must be possible
It's possible
Therefore it is possible for the body to be without the mind
Body can't equal mind then</p>
<p>II. Identity Theory</p>
<p>10) Why is the distinction between meaning and reference important for a presentation of the identity theory?
Two words can have different meanings, but refer back to the same thing. If the mental and physical both refer to the same thing, it can be used as an empirical question</p>
<p>11) What kind of reductions did the identity theory argue for?
type type reductions were the most popular that was argued for</p>
<p>12) According to the identity-theory, mental states are identical to what?
a type of brain state</p>
<p>III. Functionalism</p>
<p>13) Why is multiple realizability a criticism of the identity theory
the identity theory says that a mental state = brain state
Multiple ralizability says that a mental state has certain functions because of it's rate realtive to sensory imputs as it is different for every animal</p>
<p>14) According to the functionalist, we should identify mental states in virtue of what general trait? How is this different from what the identity theorists says?
We should identify mental states from it's effects. The identity theorists says that mental states are equal to brain states</p>
<p>15) If one is a functionalist, realtive to what three factors does one individual mental states?
Input
Other mental states
Possibility of output</p>
<p>16) With regard to dualist/materalist distinction, what is the metaphysical commitment of functionalism?
Neutral, one can be a dualist functionalist, or a materialist functionalist</p>
<p>17) What is the significance of the conceivability of "absent qualia" cases according to Chalmers?
Since you can conceive of a case of the body without the mind, it is possible, and therefore they don't entail each other. If they don't entail each other, why believe a reduction?</p>
<p>18) Why can we not reduce experience to lower level physical constitution according to Chalmers? Why can we not reduce experience to mechanisms realizing functions according to Chalmers?
Since we can conceive the body without the mind, they don't entail each other. If they don't entail, then it can't reduce
We can't reduce experiences to mechanisms realizing functions because there's no functional analysis of subjectiveness, and because of that we can answer every question, EXCEPT experience. </p>
<p>19) For Chalmers, what accounts for the distinction between an easy and a hard problem when it comes to the mind? What does he say concerning the prospects of reductionist explanations of the easy problems?
Easy - You can give a functionalist analysis
Hard - You can explain every function, but you are still left with the problem of experience, which we don't even know how to approach
The prospects of the reductionist explanations of the easy problems to Chalmers is very good, he says that if we can reduce, we can explain through function</p>
<p>20) What is the theory-theory? Why is the theory theory necessary for an eliminativist position?
Theory Theory basically says that folk psychology is a theory. It is necessary becasue eliminativist believe that folk psychology is wrong, and for it to be wrong in the first place, it must be a theory</p>
<p>21) Briefly state the basic eliminativist position
Basically it says that folk psychology is wrong and should be radically changed, which means completely scrapped and rewritten</p>
<p>22) What is the difference between an ontologically conservative and an ontologically radical theory change?
Conservative = rewording of the theory
Radical = completely scrapping of the theory, and rewriting it</p>
<p>23) Explain at least one of the arguments Churchland gives FOR eliminativism from the genral considerations of theory evaluation.
Since folk psychology tends to be wrong, why should we believe this one? </p>
<p>24) Why is Dennett's position irrealist as opposted to eliminativist?</p>
<p>Dennett basically says that folk psychology is good for certain things. We are asking the wrong question about if it's true or not, but really we should be asking on the right way to interpret it</p>
<p>25) Mary's room example and concisely state the knowledge argument</p>
<p>Mary is locked in a black and white room, but she knows everything there is to know about color. She's never experienced color before. When she is let outside, does she gain knowledge?</p>
<p>P1) Mary knows all there is to know about color
C) Mary knows all physical facts about color
P2) Mary is let outside and experiences color for the first time
C) Mary gains knowledge of color
P3) If Mary gains knowledge, there are facts other than physical since she knows all of them
C) those facts are mental</p>
<p>Cvjn while you're at it, can you explain the difference between Deontology and Utilitarianism, I figured your're beyond Morality and Ethics at this moment.</p>
<p>Actually, that's next week, if you can wait that long, I'll explain it then</p>
<p>I think I should wait.</p>