<p>Court Cases: A Brief Summary</p>
<p>Some of these are my summaries and analysis are mine, but the majority of it is copied from [url=<a href="http://www.oyez.org/%5DOyez%5B/url">http://www.oyez.org/]Oyez[/url</a>] or [url=<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page%5DWikipedia%5B/url">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page]Wikipedia[/url</a>] and some of it is from a few other random sites.</p>
<p>If you see any errors or have anything to add, let me know. As you can see, some cases are missing things.</p>
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Marbury v. Madison (1803)</p>
<p>Marbury was appointed to be a federal judge by Adams during his
Midnight appointments. Because Jefferson refused to recognize the
appointments, Marbury sued Secretary of State James Madison. Chief
Justice John Marshall, a Federalist, decided that Marbury did have
the right to his job, but that the power that allowed to court to
do so, the Judiciary Act of 1789, was unconstitutional.</p>
<p>Chief Justice: John Marshall</p>
<p>precedent: judicial review</p>
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McColluch v. Maryland (1819)</p>
<p>In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States.
In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes
on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch
of the bank, refused to pay the tax.</p>
<p>Chief Justice: John Marshall</p>
<p>precedent: federal law > state law</p>
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Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)</p>
<p>The New York Legislature had passed a law giving a monopoly on steamship
travel in New York state to two individuals, one of whom was Aaron Ogden.
Thomas Gibbons, a steamship trader who did business between New York and
New Jersey, wanted to use the New York waterways for his business, too.
He had been given federal permission to do so. He was denied access to
these waterways by the State of New York, which cited its law as enforcement.
Gibbons sued Ogden.</p>
<p>precedent: extended the definition of interstate commerce and cemented
the power of the federal government over the states when
laws conflicted</p>
<p>Chief Justice: John Marshall</p>
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Scott v. Sanford (1856)</p>
<p>Dred Scott was a slave whose master took him to a free state. Scott sued
his master on the grounds that he could not be a slave where slavery was
illegal. Scott wins the case, loses the appeal, and definitely lost in
the Supreme Court. Taney declared that slaves were property, not citizens,
and that no black person could ever be a citizen of the US. Since blacks
weren't citizens, they couldn't sue in federal court. Plus, Taney said
that Congress couldn't regulate slavery in the territories.</p>
<p>precedent: nullified the Missouri Compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the
Wilmot Proviso, and the concept of popular sovereignty.</p>
<p>Chief Justice: Roger Taney</p>
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Wabash [, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company] v. Illinois (1866)</p>
<p>question: Does the Court had to decide on whether states have the power to
regulate railroad rates for interstate shipments</p>
<p>conclusion: The Commerce Clause does not permit states to enact "direct"
burdens on interstate commerce</p>
<p>precedent: </p>
<p>effects: The decision led to the creation of the first modern regulatory
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission.</p>
<p>Chief Justice: </p>
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Slaughterhouse Cases, The (1873)</p>
<p>Louisiana had created a partial monopoly of the slaughtering business and
gave it to one company. Competitors argued that this created "involuntary
servitude," abridged "privileges and immunities," denied "equal protection
of the laws," and deprived them of "liberty and property without due process
of law."</p>
<p>question: Did the creation of the monopoly violate the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments?</p>
<p>conclusion: No. The involuntary servitude claim did not forbid limits on
the right to use one's property. The equal protection claim was
misplaced since it was established to void laws discriminating
against blacks. The due process claim simply imposes the identical
requirements on the states as the fifth amendment imposes on
the national government. The Court devoted most of its opinion
to a narrow construction of the privileges and immunities clause,
which was interpreted to apply to national citizenship, not state
citizenship.</p>
<p>precedent:</p>
<p>Chief Justice:</p>
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Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)</p>
<p>The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars
for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths
Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He
refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.</p>
<p>question: Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an
unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities
and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?</p>
<p>conclusion: No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries.</p>
<p>precedent: Separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as they were equal.</p>
<p>Chief Justice:</p>
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Korematsu v US (1944)</p>
<p>During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional
statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry
from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable
to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.</p>
<p>question: Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by
implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans
of Japanese descent?</p>
<p>conclusion: The Court sided with the government and held that the need to
protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice
Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally
suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and
peril."</p>
<p>precedent: national security can outweigh civil rights</p>
<p>Chief Justice:</p>
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Brown v. Board of Education (1954)</p>
<p>Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white
children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the
races. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings,
curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. This case was decided
together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County.</p>
<p>question: Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?</p>
<p>conclusion: Yes, despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors,
intangible issues foster and maintain inequality</p>
<p>precedent: seperate is inherently unequal</p>
<p>Chief Justice: Earl Warren</p>
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Baker v. Carr (1962)</p>
<p>Plaintiff Baker was a Republican who lived in Shelby County, Tennessee, the
county in which Memphis is located. His complaint was that though the
Tennessee State Constitution required that legislative districts be redrawn
every ten years according to the federal census to provide for districts of
substantially equal population, Tennessee had not in fact redistricted since
the census of 1900. By the time of Baker's lawsuit, his district in Shelby
County had about ten times as many residents as some of the rural districts.
His argument was that this discrepancy was causing him to fail to receive
the "equal protection under the laws" required by the Fourteenth Amendment.</p>
<p>Defendant Joe Carr was sued in his position as Secretary of State for
Tennessee. Carr was not the person who set the district lines--the state
legislature had done that--but was sued ex officio as the person who was
ultimately responsible for the conduct of elections in the state and for
the publication of district maps. The State of Tennessee argued that
legislative districts were essentially political, not judicial, questions,
as had been held by a plurality opinion of the Court in Colegrove v. Green
(1946), wherein Justice Felix Frankfurter declared that, "Courts ought not
to enter this political thicket." Frankfurter believed that relief for
legislative malapportionment had to be attained through the political process.</p>
<p>question: Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative
apportionment?</p>
<p>conclusion: Ruled that Baker's case was judiciable, and Justice Brennan
reformulated the political question doctrine, proposing a
six-part test for determining which questions were "political"
in nature</p>
<p>precedent: </p>
<p>Chief Justice: Earl Warren</p>
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