Pressures toward uniformity. When using
groups for intelligence analysis, social influences
on judgments are inevitable. Decades
of research has documented the power of groups
to change the attitudes and judgments of individual
members (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, &
Back, 1950; Lewin, 1948; Sherif, 1936). Moreover,
Asch (1951) showed that members
changed their judgments to go along with the
group, even when clear, objective evidence
showed that the groups judgment was wrong.
Uniformity helps groups establish norms for
behavior and reach their goals (e.g., Schachter,
1951). Consequently, groups exert social pressure
on members who threaten consensus, particularly
in cohesive groups and on matters of
relevance to the group. Schachter found that
group members directed more communication
to dissenters, but if the deviates refused to
change, they were ultimately rejected by the rest
of the group. More recent research shows that
even brief episodes of social exclusion or rejection
result in intense psychological distress
(Williams, 2007). Thus, group members may go
along with others in order to avoid being ostracized.
Pressures toward uniformity inhibit
members from sharing dissenting information,
challenging others, and considering alternative
courses of action, thereby eliminating or reducing
the benefits of cognitive diversity in groups.
Groupthink (Janis, 1972, 1982) is perhaps the
most well-known theory of conformity pressures
in groups. Janis hypothesized that group
cohesion, in combination with other antecedent
conditions (e.g., a directive leader, homogeneity
in members attitudes, and insulation from outside
opinion), lead group members to seek consensus
and to avoid identification and critical
evaluation of alternatives. Analyses of intelligence
failures such as faulty conclusions concerning
Iraqi WMDs in 2002 (United States
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004)
and a number of foreign policy fiascos (Janis,
1982) have pointed to groupthink as a major
cause.
Despite widespread acceptance of groupthink
as valid by both lay and academic audiences,
the model has been called into question due to
the methods used to evaluate it and to the lack
of support for its basic principles (e.g., Baron,
2005; Fuller & Aldag, 1998; Turner & Pratkanis,
1998). Although historical case studies
have found support for some aspects of groupthink
(e.g., see Turner & Pratkanis, 1998), this
approach has generally involved analysis of
failed policy decisions, which is subject to selection
biases (Fuller & Aldag, 1998). Inclusion
of successful decisions shows that other theoretical
models better account for group
decisions (Peterson, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, &
Martorana, 1998). Controlled experiments of
the model are relatively scarce, and results
of laboratory experiments testing the effects of
cohesivenessthe principal antecedent of
groupthinkare mixed and often inconsistent
with predictions of the model (e.g., Flowers,
1977; Mullen, Anthony, Salas, & Driskell,
1994).
There is little question that many groups experience
groupthink symptoms and processes
(Baron, 2005) and that these symptoms and
processes are associated with defective decision
making. However, whereas phenomena such as
failure to consider alternatives, pressures toward
uniformity, and self-censorship can precipitate
poor decisions, they do not support the
groupthink model as a whole given that they
often occur in the absence of antecedents of
groupthink. Likewise, purported antecedent
conditions of groupthink do not necessarily lead
to defective group processes or outcomes.
In terms of intelligence analysis teams, we
anticipate that heterogeneity in membership
may reduce pressures toward uniformity (e.g.,
Janis, 1982), but several characteristics of the
task and context in are likely to elicit such
pressures. For example, Kelly et al. (1997)
found that group members opinions were more
likely to change when they perceived a problem
as judgmental rather than intellective. Not surprisingly,
conformity is more extreme under
more ambiguous conditions (Baron, 2005), and
when groups are subject to time pressure (Kelly
et al., 1997; Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, &
Kruglanski, 2003). In addition, Davis (2008)
identifies several other types of conformity
pressure that inhibit intelligence analysts from
introducing new information, including pressure
from managers (discussed above); the
presence of a coalition of analysts who are
psychologically invested in a paradigm (a phenomenon
that may share common features with
confirmation bias or overconfidence); situations
in which groups have attained hard-won consensus
on a controversial issue and do not want
to risk losing it (a phenomenon associated with
escalation of commitment); and politicization
and external pressures that occur in the form of
implicit or explicit messages from senior policymakers
that intelligence contrary to an emerging
policy line may be received as unwelcome
or counterproductive.