<p>If any of this is true, it is not a good picture of our leadership, civilian or military:</p>
<p>The</a> War Within - A Secret White House History 2006-2008 - By Bob Woodward (washingtonpost.com)</p>
<p>Distrubing...if true. Why were those White House documents unclassified just for Woodward?<br>
washingtonpost.com</a> - nation, world, technology and Washington area news and headlines :</p>
<p>" Almost all of the Bush administration's internal deliberations on the Iraq war have been classified. At Woodward's request, the White House agreed to declassify a dozen documents, and Woodward independently reviewed dozens more. In addition, critical information came from an array of memos, letters, official notes, personal notes, briefing summaries, PowerPoint slides, e-mails, journals, calendars and meeting agendas. "</p>
<p>I know the JCOS act in an advisory role...but The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is supposed to be the primary advisor to the President, the VP and the Secretary of Defense, not a retired Army General.</p>
<p>Yep, this story is developing so many subplots and sidetracks there is no telling where it will end. My biggest, of many, "cannot believe its" is the disclosure of special ops missions while they are still ongoing.</p>
<p>Keane ought to be shot.</p>
<p>"Keane ought to be shot."
As usual a thoughtful post by USNA69.
Never mind that Gen Keane was apparently working as the presidents agent because the President clearly did not believe he was getting the advice and the complete picture from the SecDef prior to Nov 2006; the CJCS or the CINCCent. Is this story true in every aspect? Who knows but note that you don't see the administration trumpeting denials of the story, while you do see Rumsfeld and Adm Fallon gone and Gen Petraeous promoted to Cdr of Centcom, and you do see a different ambassador on the ground in Iraq. I would say that in substance if he did as has been described- Gen Keane did the country a service by transmitting Gen Petraeous views to the NCA instead of allowing them to get scrubbed, whitewashed or blocked by commanders and staff not on the ground.</p>
<p>
<p>Perhaps a little too 'thoughtful' for you. I will attempt to explain.</p>
<p>First off, as stated in the initial post, my premise is based on the assumption that the article is correct. Woodward initially states that the surge was NOT NECESSARY:
[quote] At least three other factors were as important as, or even more important than, the surge. These factors either have not been reported publicly or have received less attention than the influx of troops.</p>
<p>Beginning in the late spring of 2007, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies launched a series of top-secret operations that enabled them to locate, target and kill key individuals in groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency and renegade Shia militias, or so-called special groups. The operations incorporated some of the most highly classified techniques and information in the U.S. government. </p>
<p>A second important factor in the lessening of violence was the so-called Anbar Awakening, in which tens of thousands of Sunnis turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq and signed up with U.S. forces. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had made a strategic mistake in the province, overplaying its hand. Its members had performed forced marriages with women from local tribes, taken over hospitals, used mosques for beheading operations, mortared playgrounds and executed citizens, leaving headless bodies with signs that read, "Don't remove this body or the same thing will happen to you." The sheer brutality eroded much of the local support for al-Qaeda in Iraq.</p>
<p>A third significant break came Aug. 29, when militant Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his powerful Mahdi Army to suspend operations, including attacks against U.S. troops. Petraeus and others knew it was not an act of charity. The order followed a gunfight between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in the holy city of Karbala, during which more than 50 Shia pilgrims gathering for an annual festival had been killed and another 275 wounded. Sadr's order marked an unexpected stroke of good luck, another in a series for the Americans.
</p>
<p>Therefore, if Woodward is correct and the surge was not responsible for our successes and therefore not necessary, then the entire ad hoc Bush-Patraeus back door "chain of command" was also wrong. I don’t know what kind of chain of command you folks in the Army have but in the Navy we have one to which we adhere and people are held accountable. If we cannot follow it or change it, we resign. Note Adm Fallon’s actions. More should have followed him.</p>
<p>So, again assuming Woodward was correct, the established chain of command was also correct in their views. Enter the renegade, Keane. When he donned a uniform, he became a part of the Army. He had a chain of command to which to answer, not to pretend to ignore the Army COS upon a chance meeting at Walter Reed. He subverted this. In my book, this is treason. In wartime, treason is punishable by death.</p>
<p>HMM- "the entire adhoc Bush.... chain was wrong". So then would Bush be guilty of that same treason? Or could he direct something for which he wasn't guilty of treason, but anyone actually carrying out his request would be guilty of treason?
I listened to an interview with Woodward on Tuesday (NPR FreshAir)where he quite clearly states that there were 4 elements of relatively equal importance that drove things in Iraq to whatever degree of success currently enjoyed -those 4 elements includes the surge- (which is what your quote says as well: "three other factors were as important as...)". Woodwards point- which he also states above is that the other 3 are relatively unknown- not that he would or does denigrate the surge as a major factor in bringing the success.
Ought to bone up on your chain of command - The service chiefs - including the the Army Cof S-are not in any chain of command- their legal responsibility is to train and provide supporting forces. The Unified CINC to the SecDef is the Chain with the CJCS as military adviser. The Goldwater Nichols act clearly does not preclude the president from asking for advice from other sources and in fact the President has routinely utilized both adhoc and formal outside reviews and information gatherers. </p>
<p>Beyond the whole question of necessity for the war to begin with is the sheer incompetence under which it was manged for a long time. What is sad here is that Casey was bumped up to Army CoS to begin with when he should have been relieved as the Cdr Ground Forces; Adm Fallon was appointed to be a combatant commander of a ground war of which he had zero experience or understanding (because he been successful as a diplomat in Pacom as if Iraq was primarily a diplomatic problem) and Rumsfeld should have been fired by January of 2006 for utterly failing to comprehend the changed nature of the war he was in. That Bush found himself getting conflicting information from his NSC (things are going to hell fast) and the CinC and military advisors (rosey picture don't need to do anything different) is the issue here. Bush (and Cheney) utilized Gen Keane because he legally could do so and because they wanted to get a different view.<br>
As for Gen Keane- interesting thing- he declined the assignment as Army CofS replacing Gen Shinseki under Rumsfeld and retired because he couldn't stomach the mismanagement- which is what got him on Bush's radar screen to begin with.
But I suppose that if USNA69 thinks that the president and Gen Keane were engaged in traitorous activity - it must be so.</p>
<p>Traitorous activity for the President of the United States would be an interesting legal precedence. However, incompetence and total mismanagement is not totally out of reason. Let's look at the time line.</p>
<p>The first indication of a surge was 11/20/06 when Gen Pace is informed of such by the White House. There is no indication that Keane become involved until 12/11/06 when the American Enterprise Institute briefed the White House. Within a week, Rumsfeld is replaced. Immediately after that, Patraeus is announced as the replacement in Iraq for Casey. Also, Adm Fallon is announced as the replacement for Gen Abizzid. As you have pointed out, Casey, who was vocally opposed to the surge was promoted to Army Chief of Staff. One of Secretary Gate’s first moves is to not do the normal reappointment of General Pace as CJCS, but promotes Adm Mullen, the CNO, and also a vocal opponent of the surge, to replace him. Within a few months, the newly replaced military leadership, Mullen, Casey, and Fallon, all opposed to the surge, is in place. We don’t know Gates opinion from this article. Simultaneously, Keane, allowing himself to become a pawn of the Administration, commences to circumvent this new leadership by establishing a link directly between Iraq and the White House.. </p>
<p>The new leadership was in place. If they were not capable of executing the plan, in place before they were appointed, they should nevert have been there. The surge orders had been executed. Patraeus saluted smartly and said “yes sir”. Things were moving as per the White House’s plan. Why was Keane necessary? The whole episode stinks. </p>
<p>In my day, when one received conflicting orders from someone not immediately superior in the chain of command, the first, and proper, thing to do was to notify that immediate superior. Keane allowed his ego to be fueled and, probably unnecessarily, circumvented the system. He was way out of line and has done serious unnecessary damage to both our military leadership and the civilian/military interface thereof.</p>
<p>Also, in my day, part of an officer’s responsibility was, when they disagreed with their superior, to go behind closed doors and let the fur fly. Upon departing the office, he was to state, “I believe” followed by whatever the point of contention was. Not the captain’s belief, nor the Admirals, but “I”. Anyone unable to do this did not belong in that chain of command. In this situation, it did not happen. And Woodward has not fully explained why.</p>
<p>I guess Army leadership is somehow different? It would take some strange ideas to make the following comment:</p>
<p>
[quote]
The service chiefs - including the the Army Cof S-are not in any chain of command-
[/quote]
</p>
<p>"Strange ideas"??- it's a statement of legal fact that every officer who has served in the Joint Staff or Service staff since 1986 knows full well. Go read the 1986 Defense Reorg Act-(better known as Goldwater- Nichols ) it's the letter of the law that the Army CoS , the CNO , CMC and AFCoS are specifically excluded from the chain of command- their responsibilities are only as force providers to combattant commanders. What's strange is not knowing that- I guarantee you that all of the Joint Chiefs know full well that they are not in the chain of command, and that the role of the CJCS is: "the principle military advisor to the President" - note the wording "principle advisor" - not "only" advisor, and not "commander". In this case- Bush obviously didn't believe the advice he was getting from his military advisors. No argument that the administration balled up lots of things badly- it would appear that appointing Fallon; Mullen and Casey would fall into that category as well. The administration obviously didn't want appointment fights in a newly hostile congress- but it would appear that they were more concerned about that than they were about getting flag officers who salute and drive on. Mullen came in talking to Army families about about limiting Army tours to 12 months- while the President was announcing the surge; and Casey was doing likewise while "gloom and dooming" about the Army being "broken" as opposed to focusing on how to win the war ("do more of the same thing" was apparently the Casey strategy.)
It's pretty naive to believe that the right thing for the 4 star Theater commander to do is just to tell his boss that he needed more troops and more support on the ground and then expect that he just sits there while the CINC sends a different sitrep and priorities up to the White House. At the O4 level maybe you bury your objections when the O6 spins your report- but at the 4 star level you think that's the right thing to do? Dream on- that's not what we pay officers for in any service and the President has a responsibiity to dig as deep and as hard as he can to determine what's going on on the ground- even if his conduit is the retired vice chief of the Army. In fact Bushs biggest failure was not digging past the bureaucratic roadblocks that were being thrown up from 2004-to January 2007.</p>
<p>First off, your assumption that my bypassing the chain of command comments were addressed to the chiefs of staff was erroneous. The new Sec Def is definitely in the unified commander's chain of command and he was also bypassed. No excuse.</p>
<p>Who is in what chain of command? Yes, you are absolutely correct, unified commanders, in the operational control of their units, report directly to the Sec Def (not Gen Keane, again, the Sec Def). However, as you well know, there are many chain of commands; functional, administrative, organizational. etc., etc. etc., and they all overlap. To state that someone is not in ANY chain of command is to imply that he has neither responsibility nor accountability. I doubt if that is the case for a Chief of Staff. What this discussion is about is a change in theater troop strength and the overall resulting effects on readiness. Don't tell me that the Chief of Staff is not a viable part of this decision making process.</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Again, in January of 2007 he had either already dug past the bureaucratic roadblocks or had given up on them because they had all been replaced. He was working with a clean slate. And he still continued to bypass them. This is my concern.</p>
<p>Let's not get sidetracked into the irrelevance of who did their job and who didn't. That is not the issue. The issue is how it was improperly handled.</p>
<p>So then your contention is that the President - who clearly was Gen Keane's sponsor in this, had no right to do so? Apparently you view the President as constrained to utilize the formal chain of command and no other method for receiving alternative views of what is going on at the scene? Further, that the Theater Commander should have had nothing to do with an envoy who is operating under the president's direction? Even though the President has reason to believe that his intent is being stonewalled or not executed with the vigor that he is expecting? So in short the process (going thru the formal command loops with all of the attendant bureaucratic back and forth that the JCS is so well known for- is more important in your view than the outcome? Read again what Gen Keane had to say to Bush and Cheney. It sure as heck isn't irrelevant- in fact what was going on here it would appear, is that the JCS and the CINC were stonewalling the Presidents chosen course of action and the General chosen to execute it because they didn't want to execute it. Well known bureaucratic tactic- wait them out. As far as the Sec Def being out of the loop- it doesn't say that- in fact it doesn't talk much about the Sec Def at all. However, the Sec Def at some point came on board and told the Joint Staff to stop impeding Gen Keane's access. </p>
<p>"As Keane was laying out his view, President Bush walked in.
"I know you're talking to Dave," Bush said to Keane. "I know that the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon have some concerns." The JCS had not favored the surge of 30,000 troops that Bush had decided was essential to quell the escalating violence in Iraq; the chiefs were deeply worried that the surge left no strategic reserve for an unexpected crisis elsewhere. </p>
<p>Keane repeated what he had just told Cheney: The JCS and Adm. William J. Fallon, Petraeus's boss at Central Command, were insisting on studies and reports to justify even the smallest request for more resources for Iraq. Their persistent pressure, pushing Petraeus for a faster drawdown, was taking its toll.
"There is very little preparation," Keane said, "for somebody who grows up in a military culture to have an unsupportive chain of command above you and still be succeeding. You normally get fired." The result, he said, is that Petraeus "starts to look for ways to get rid of this pressure, which means some kind of accommodation."</p>
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</p>
<p>You got it. Finally. </p>
<p>Two wrongs don't make a right. If things are broken, fix them. If I remember correctly, your Goldwater-Nichols Act was specifically enacted to eliminate the "beuracratic back and forth". If civilian leadership bypasses the military experts, our checks and balance system is rendered inop.</p>
<p>In this particular situation, we had a retired out of the loop uninformed General effecting policy. Totally unsat.</p>
<p>In the humble opinion of USNA 69 anyway.</p>
<p>I have to agree with USNA69 for a change. :D</p>
<p>I saw part of Tom Brokaw's Meet the Press interview with Bob Woodward this morning. This part caught my attention:</p>
<p>MR. BROKAW: We want to show a picture to our audience of a man that they probably not--do not know, but he's extremely well known in national security circles and certainly in the military, and that's retired four star General Jack Keane, who became kind of a subcontractor for the president and for Vice President Cheney.</p>
<p>MR. WOODWARD: Yep, a, a shadow general. And it got to the--he, he is one of the mentors for General Petraeus, the Iraq commander. And he would go to Iraq and find out what's going on and then come for an hour or two and give a back-channel report to Dick, Dick Cheney in his home or his--in his office. And a year ago, things were so bad that the president used General Keane to send a message of support to General Petraeus. I asked the president about this war. You know, why did you do this? You have a secretary of defense, you have a central commander who's in the chain of command. And he said, "Well, I wanted Dave to know--Dave Petraeus--that he will have exactly what he needs." That was a year ago. Bob Gates, 10 months, had been secretary of defense, did not know that this was going on. One of the challenges the next president is going to have is to fix a very dysfunctional, broken relationship, tragically so, I believe, between the civilian side and the military side.</p>
<p>The full transcript of the Meet the Press discussion can be read here - it is brief - two pages long: Sept</a>. 14: Former NYC Mayor Rudy Giuliani (R), Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Bob Woodward, Chuck Todd - Meet the Press, online at MSNBC - MSNBC.com</p>
<p>Here is what the White House has to say about Woodward's book:
Afterword:</a> Mr. Woodward's Reporting vs. Mr. Woodward's Editorializing</p>
<p>I plan to read Bing West's "The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq" for another perspective.</p>
<p>
[quote]
One of the challenges the next president is going to have is to fix a very dysfunctional, broken relationship, tragically so, I believe, between the civilian side and the military side.
[/quote]
</p>
<p>Perhaps the solution is for the next administration to simply hire keydet who will attempt to convince them that the present course is acceptable.</p>
<p>How many times have you heard something along the lines of “if I were President I would” …you can add your choice of achievement or initiative. Or “If I had that power I would….” </p>
<p>In reading the summary of events it suggests an impotent chief executive apparently incapable of making the system work to achieve his objectives. Was it a case of executive incompetence and a lack of leadership skills or was he intimidated by the brass? How could he think using a back channel to obtain information would lead to a better outcome, unless the objective was keeping the obvious from public view? The story paints a remarkable and very disturbing picture of a dysfunctional system of leadership on the civilian and military side.</p>
<p>The back channel maneuvering commenced basically within days of a total shakeup on the military side of the house. I really don't think the blame lies with the military.</p>
<p>rjrzoom57- it does paint that picture- clearly there were basic failures of competence and communication in the prosecuting of the war. Either couldn't articulate a strategy or couldn't impose that vision on a resistant defense/state bureaucracy. Back channels to get unfiltered information are not so uncommon (and aren't immoral or illegal) but the need to resort to them to get action does indicate some wholesale failures of leadership.</p>